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A MATTER OF EXPECTATIONS:
INTERPRETING THE STATUTORY
PREEMPTION OF LOCAL
ASSISTANCE TO FEDERAL
FIREARMS REGULATORS 
This Note examines Alaska’s relationship to the federal regulatory
process.  Specifically, the Note analyzes an Alaskan preemption
statute that prevents local officials from restricting the sale of fire-
arms.  The Note begins by examining a Justice Scalia footnote in
Printz v. United States, a recent Supreme Court decision invali-
dating portions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.
That footnote suggests that Congress does not have the power to
force state compliance with federal regulation.  This Note dis-
cusses how the Printz dicta, along with the lack of legislative his-
tory, creates uncertainty in interpreting the Alaska preemption
statute.  The Note applies a plain-meaning interpretation of the
statute but concludes that such an interpretation is inevitably
flawed.  The Note concludes that the Alaska statute does not bar
the voluntary participation of local officials in federal firearms
regulation, and that this conclusion is consistent with Printz.    
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the era between the New Deal and the current decade,
commentators regarded the Supreme Court’s doctrinal approach
to Commerce Clause regulatory legislation as a “fixed and funda-
mental point” on the constellation of “the modern legal conscious-
ness.”1  Shattering the languor of post-New Deal federalism doc-
trine, this decade’s Supreme Court jurisprudence2 has energized
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1. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 120 (1991).  See
generally id. at 105-30.  But see H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Con-
stitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 664-81 (1993) (describing persistent difficul-
ties of reconciling principles of federalism with federal regulation).
2. The Supreme Court has invalidated several federal statutes because it
found such statutes to be inconsistent with federalism.  See Printz v. United
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anew the debate over the states’ relationship to the federal regula-
tory process.3  By virtue of its vast natural resources and its native
communities, Alaska and its citizens traditionally have lived with a
substantial degree of federal regulation.4  The development of the
                                                                                                                                
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (invalidating a federal requirement that local law
enforcement officers perform background checks on putative gun purchasers);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion over suits to enforce negotiating duties under federal Indian gaming law vio-
lates Eleventh Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(holding federal criminal statute prohibiting the possession of a gun near a school
was unconstitutional because the statute was not sufficiently related to interstate
commerce); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down fed-
eral statutory requirement that states develop waste disposal plans for, or take
title to, radioactive waste because federal provision constituted impermissible en-
croachment into state governance).  The Court also has discussed principles of
federalism in disposing of related questions.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997) (discussing federalism in connection with invalidation of a portion
of Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,
117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997) (interpreting Eleventh Amendment to bar exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction over suits for injunctive and declaratory relief against state offi-
cials’ interference with property interests in submerged lands).
3. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995)
(discussing the revolutionary character of Lopez); Daniel A. Farber, The Consti-
tution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original
Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 618-26 (1995) (observing emergence of
dual sovereignty analysis in the Court); Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1995
Term – Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (1995) (rejecting
characterization that Lopez was revolutionary); Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise
of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347 (1997) (discussing
whether trumps of centralized authority are most effective at preventing its over-
reaching); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2181, 2181 (1998) (describing “phoenix-like”
rise of post-New Deal federalism-based constraints on federal legislation); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term – Comment: Dueling Sovereign-
ties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1995)
(commenting on Court’s federalism jurisprudence); Symposium, The Law and
Economics of Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 249 (1997) (evaluating institutional
adequacy of federalism-based structures of governance).
4. One example is the pervasiveness of regulation of Alaska land, as recently
discussed in the context of regulating subsistence hunting.  See David S. Case,
Subsistence and Self-determination: Can Alaska Natives Have a More “Effective
Voice”?, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 1009, 1015-17 (1989); see also David G. Shapiro,
Note,  Jurisdiction and the Hunt: Subsistence Regulation, ANILCA, and Totemoff,
14 ALASKA L. REV. 115 (1997) (discussing preemptive effect of a comprehensive
federal land regulation scheme upon a state prosecution for spotlight hunting).
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debate over federalism will continue to hold particular significance
for Alaska.
Part of the resurgent debate has been fueled by the Court’s re-
examination of the federal regulatory process.5  For example, the
Court has invalidated federal statutory requirements that states
develop programmatic solutions to problems of joint state and fed-
eral interest.6  Most recently, in Printz v. United States,7 a divided
Court invalidated parts of the Brady Handgun Violence Preven-
tion Act8 in a five to four decision.9  In the process, the Court re-
jected the premise that Congress had any power to compel state
officials to execute federal regulatory regimes.10  The Printz Court,
however, did not address explicitly whether Congress might enlist
voluntary participation by state officials in the administration of a
federal regulatory scheme.11  The Court did suggest, however, that
state officials who voluntarily choose to help administer such
schemes could be precluded from doing so by statutes preempting
local firearms regulation in general.12
Alaska has a local preemption statute that prevents local offi-
cials from restricting the right to own, possess, or transport fire-
arms.13  Proponents of firearms regulation have pointed out that
thirty-nine other states have similar local preemption statutes.14
The Court’s unelaborated endorsement of such statutes in Printz
provides little guidance about how to interpret those statutes in
light of voluntary local participation in federal regulatory schemes.
Indeed, the majority clearly was divided on this question.  The re-
sult of the Court’s foray into this area has been to inject confusion
into a vibrant debate about federal authority15 and to cloud the ba-
5. See supra note 2.
6. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 177.
7. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
8. Pub. L. No. 103-159, §§ 101-106, 107 Stat. 1536-44 (1993) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3759 (1994)).
9. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2365.
10. See id. at 2380.
11. See id. at 2384.
12. See id. at 2384 n.18.
13. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.145(a) (Michie 1996).
14. See Handgun Control, Inc., State Firearms Legislation: Selected Summary
By State (visited Oct. 1, 1998) <http://www.handguncontrol.org/b-main.htm>; cf.
Addendum to Letter from Stephen P. Halbrook, Counsel for Sheriff Jay Printz, to
President Bill Clinton and Attorney General Janet Reno (June 30, 1997) (on file
with Alaska Law Review) (citing 19 preemption statutes).
15. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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sis for the practical application of statutes like the Alaska preemp-
tion statute.16
Part II of this Note discusses the uncertainty created by the
Printz Court’s statements regarding local participation in federal
firearms regulation schemes and how those difficulties are com-
pounded by the sparse legislative history of the Alaska statute.
Part III reconstructs a practical basis for construing the applicabil-
ity of the Alaska preemption statute by evaluating its text.  Part IV
examines the federal nexus between the reconstructed text and the
federal firearms regulation regime in order to evaluate the degree
to which a state official may interact with or assist federal govern-
mental entities that seek to enforce federal firearms regulations
generally.  Part IV’s analysis of the statutory text suggests that lo-
cal law enforcement officials in Alaska voluntarily may assist fed-
eral government officials in enforcing federal firearms regulations.
Moreover, local officials under certain circumstances may have a
duty to cooperate with federal enforcement of firearms regula-
tions.  This Note concludes that such cooperation is consistent with
Printz, the Alaska Constitution, the Alaska preemption statute,
and with doctrinally sound federalism principles.
II.  UNCERTAINTY OF INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY FOR ALASKA’S
LOCAL FIREARMS REGULATION PREEMPTION STATUTE
In Printz, the Supreme Court suggested that states legiti-
mately could prohibit local cooperation with federal firearms
regulation by enacting express state statutory proscriptions.17  In a
very brief footnoted comment, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Court contemplated whether Montana law prohibited Sheriff Jay
Printz from voluntarily participating in the administration of the
16. Evidence against Printz’s ability to provide a principled and persuasive
basis for analyzing federalism-based issues is abundant.  As such, the Court’s
Printz analysis already has been rejected or questioned as precedent by several
lower federal courts.  See West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding Printz did not determine whether Fair Labor Standards Act ap-
plied to state and local government salary determinations); McGarry v. Director,
Dept. of Revenue, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025-26 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that,
notwithstanding Printz, application of Americans with Disabilities Act is not pre-
cluded by Tenth Amendment); City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp.
789, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining that, rather than “reviv[ing] a substantive
analysis under the Tenth Amendment,” Printz holding evolved from “structural
defects in the . . . statute[]” because it contained no “analysis of whether the state
functions that were affected were core functions of the states”).
17. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384 n.18.
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Brady regulatory regime.18  Without elaborating on his reasoning,
Justice Scalia concluded that Montana law “clearly” prohibited
Sheriff Printz from “taking on these federal responsibilities.”19  Jus-
tice Scalia also stated that a similarly written Arizona statute might
prohibit Arizona sheriffs from voluntarily taking part in the Brady
plan.20  Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court suggests Supreme
Court imprimatur of state restraints upon municipalities, counties,
or other state political subdivisions.21  The operation of these re-
straints in the manner that Justice Scalia contemplates easily could
eviscerate the ability of the federal government to administer ef-
fectively any federal firearms regulatory scheme without a dra-
matic expansion of the regulatory role of the federal government.22
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence qualified Justice Scalia’s en-
thusiastic endorsement of state restraints on local firearms regula-
tion in the face of federal regulation.  Justice O’Connor made clear
that she did not believe that the Court’s holding swept away the
goals of the Brady Act.23  She underscored that, with respect to the
Brady Bill,  “[s]tates and chief law enforcement officers may vol-
untarily continue to participate.”24  Moreover, she pointed out that
18. See id.
19. Id.  With certain inapplicable exceptions, the relevant Montana statute
provides that
no county, city, town, consolidated local government, or other local gov-
ernment unit may prohibit, register, tax, license, or regulate the pur-
chase, sale or other transfer (including delay in purchase, sale, or other
transfer), ownership, possession, transportation, use, or unconcealed car-
rying of any weapon, including a rifle, shotgun, handgun, or concealed
handgun.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-351 (1995).
20. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384 n.18.  The Arizona statute provides that a
“political subdivision of this state shall not require the licensing or registration of
firearms or prohibit the ownership, purchase, sale or transfer of firearms.”  ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-3108 (B) (1989).
21. Certainly Justice Scalia’s comments are not central to the holding, and
hence are safely considered dicta.  However, dismissing or trivializing his observa-
tions as dicta is a serious mistake.  Lower courts adrift in an ocean of novelty may
graft onto dicta as the polestars of judicial navigation.  The effect could be sub-
stantial, and sometimes harmful.  See Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by
Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 769, 784-98 (1998) (evaluating harms and
benefits of judicial use of dicta).  Practitioners likewise may fall into the same
traps.  See, e.g., Letter from Stephen P. Halbrook to Elanor D. Acheson (Nov. 12,
1997) (on file with Alaska Law Review) (misunderstanding Justice Scalia’s com-
ments to constitute part of the Court’s holding).
22. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. See id. at 2385 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id.
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the Court had not held that congressional imposition of “purely
ministerial reporting requirements” upon state officials was inva-
lid.25  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence noted specific reservations
about the reach of the Court’s five to four decision.  It is implausi-
ble to think that Justice Scalia’s footnoted comment has settled the
issue.
Although Justice O’Connor disagreed with Justice Scalia’s ob-
servation, she failed to elaborate the basis for her disagreement,26
and consequently failed to delimit Printz with much precision.27
For example, she failed to define the doctrinal elements of what
constitutes a purely ministerial reporting requirement.28  As an ex-
ample of such reporting requirements, Justice O’Connor cited
without elaboration a federal statute that requires state law en-
forcement agencies to report cases of missing children to the U.S.
Department of Justice.29  Although useful as a comparative
marker, Justice O’Connor’s invocation of the missing children
statute fails to provide the exactness necessary to define a coherent
approach to the application of dual sovereignty principles.  In addi-
tion, her statement about the ability of state and local officials to
continue participating in the Brady scheme does not address the
manner in which those actors permissibly may do so.  Nothing in
her statement expressly bars a state preemption statute like
Alaska’s from precluding local officials from voluntary participa-
tion in a federal regulatory program.30  To be sure, in the absence
of Justice O’Connor’s restraint on the majority opinion, the im-
plied rejection of federal regulation could jeopardize a multitude
of federal regulatory schemes enacted pursuant to Congress’s
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2385 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
29. See id. (discussing applicability of Court’s opinion to 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a)
(1994)).
30. The U.S. Department of Justice has taken the position that the parts of
the Brady Act unaffected by the Court’s ruling in Printz “plainly contemplate,
though they do not require, that state and local law enforcement officials will
conduct background checks.”  Letter from Elanor D. Acheson, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Office of Policy Development, U.S. Department of Justice, to Ste-
phen P. Halbrook, Attorney for Sheriff Jay Printz (Nov. 5, 1997), at 6 (on file with
Alaska Law Review).  But see Letter from Stephen P. Halbrook to Elanor D.
Acheson (Nov. 12, 1997) (on file with Alaska Law Review) (arguing that back-
ground checks are inconsistent with laws such as Montana Code Section 45-8-
351).
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authority to regulate interstate commerce.31  Nevertheless, standing
alone, the Court’s opinion in Printz does not offer sufficient guid-
ance to interpret the Alaska preemption statute in a coherent and
meaningful way.
Analyzing the effect of the Alaska municipal firearms regula-
tion statute also is challenging because the statute itself does not
have any antecedents.  The 1985 statute did not replace an earlier
analogue.  Instead, the provision was part of a larger state bill that
sought to update and reorganize the Alaska municipal code.32  The
text of the preemption statute reads:
(a) A municipality may not, except by ordinance ratified by the
voters, restrict the right to own or possess firearms within a resi-
dence or transport unloaded firearms.
(b) This section applies to home rule and general law municipali-
ties.33
The preemption provision was not part of the original proposal
and was added before the House Judiciary Committee reported
the bill out of the committee.34  The relative novelty of the statute
and its sparse legislative history has discouraged judicial review.
No reported case has construed the contours or operation of the
statute.  Doctrinally, the statute appears to be an orphan.
The statute lacks doctrinal footing from any judicial source,
but that fact in itself would not normally bar its application.  Were
there some administrative source of authority construing the stat-
ute and implementing its mandate, its contours more easily might
be discerned within the context of the state’s administrative law.35
31. See, e.g., Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 588-92 (1989) (preempting
California community property laws that required waiver of military retirement
pay); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (preempting California wage law
by Federal Arbitration Act); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 375 (1986)
(preempting New Jersey tax on intrastate chemical and oil industries to fund
cleanup of toxic wastes); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982)
(preempting Illinois anti-takeover statute); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 159, 160-61, 173-74 (1978) (preempting Washington laws designed to reduce
possibility of oil tanker spill).
32. See 1985 Senate J. 872, S. 14-HB 72, 1st Legis. Sess. (Alaska).
33. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.145 (Michie 1996).
34. Compare H. Bill 72, 14th Leg., 1st Legis. Sess. § 29.10.200 (Alaska) (as
referred to the House Committees on Community and Regional Affairs, Judici-
ary, and Finance on Jan. 16, 1985) with H. Bill 72, 14th Legis., 1st Legis. Sess. §§
29.10.200, 29.35.145 (Alaska) (as reported out of the House Judiciary Committee
on May 2, 1985).
35. Alaska has three different standards of review for state administrative ac-
tions that do not involve questions of fact.  A reasonable basis test applies to
questions of law within the scope of an agency’s expertise.  See Rose v. Commer-
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However, no state regulation has been promulgated under the
authority of the preemption statute.  In addition, the state of
Alaska generally does not report its administrative adjudicatory
proceedings.  Therefore, there are no reported rulings of either a
judicial or administrative nature to provide guidance as to the ap-
plicability of the statute.  In an absence of such direct doctrinal or
administrative interpretations of the preemption statute, Alaska
state courts traditionally examine statutory text to determine
whether it is ambiguous or so plain as to require no interpretation
from the courts.36
III.  RECONSTRUCTING THE TEXT OF THE ALASKA STATUTE
A. The Deceptive Simplicity of “Plain Meaning”
Determining whether a statute is ambiguous or whether a
court may interpret and apply the statute according to its “plain
meaning” requires the court first to construe the text.37  The
Alaska preemption statute provides that “[a] municipality may not,
except by ordinance ratified by the voters, restrict the right to own
or possess firearms within a residence or transport unloaded fire-
arms.”38  The statute further states that it “applies to home rule and
general law municipalities.”39  The statutory text is very similar to
that of the Montana and Arizona statutes cited by the Court in
Printz.40  But differences among the statutes and among the juris-
dictions to which they apply indicate the need to evaluate inde-
pendently the elements of the Alaska statute in order to construct
its meaning within the context of Alaska law.  Accordingly, a
“plain meaning” construction of the Alaska statute presumably
                                                                                                                                
cial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 647 P.2d 154, 161 (Alaska 1982).  Administrative
regulations are subject to judicial review under a “reasonable and not arbitrary”
standard.  See Handley v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 838 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Alaska
1992).  The courts use a “substitution of judgment” standard for questions of law
where no agency expertise is involved.  See id.
36. See In re Babcock, 387 P.2d 694, 696 (Alaska 1963) (citing State v. Dug-
gan, 6 A. 787, 788 (R.I. 1886)).  Justice Scalia has helped revive an interest in
“textualist” statutory interpretation by articulating a theory that posits a strong
relationship between textualism and democratic theory.  See Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTER-
PRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
37. See Babcock, 387 P.2d at 696.
38. ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.145(a) (Michie 1996).
39. Id. at § 29.35.145(b).
40. Cf. supra notes 19 & 20.
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would first take into account the elements of the statute without
consulting the judicially-created doctrine of other states.41
Therefore, a sensible interpretation of the Alaska statute ac-
cording to “plain meaning” principles might result in something
like the following:
A municipality could regulate the ownership or possession of
firearms or the transport of unloaded firearms only if it first ob-
tained through referendum the approval of the municipality’s
voters for the ordinance authorizing the regulation.
Certainly, an interpreter of the statute could stop there and pro-
ceed with the next step of the analysis – that of determining
whether the statute implicated local officials who voluntarily facili-
tated the federal government’s regulation of firearms.  The fol-
lowing analysis will illustrate the inadequacy of the “plain mean-
ing” approach to the interpretation of the Alaska preemption
statute.
B. The Elements of the Alaska Preemption Statute
1.  Applicability to Municipalities.  The first element of the
Alaska preemption statute defines the class of actors to whom the
statute applies.  Accordingly, the statute addresses itself to
municipalities.  Under the Alaska State Constitution, all local
powers must either be exercised by boroughs or cities.42  The
source of legal authority for different boroughs or cities will vary
according to whether the locality has adopted a home rule charter
or is a unified municipality43 and thereby has assumed “all
legislative powers not prohibited by law or charter.”44  Those
localities adopting a home rule or unification charter are
considered “home rule” municipalities.45  On the other hand,
general law municipalities are localities without a charter and are
authorized to exercise legislative powers only as specifically
prescribed by the state legislature.46  The Alaska statute
41. See Babcock, 387 P.2d at 696.
42. See ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 2.
43. Under Alaska law, a unified municipality is “a single unit of home rule
government” uniting “[a] borough and all cities in the borough.”  ALASKA STAT. §
29.06.190 (Michie 1996).  Boroughs and cities seeking to form a unified munici-
pality must establish a unification charter.  See id. §§ 29.06.190-.390.  An elected
commission drafts the charter, then submits the charter for ratification by the vot-
ers throughout the borough.  See id. §§ 29.06.270, 29.06.360.  The ratification of
the charter “operates to dissolve all municipalities in the area.”  Id. § 29.06.370.
44. ALASKA STAT. § 29.04.010 (Michie 1996).
45. See id.
46. See id. § 29.04.020.
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preempting local firearms regulation was written expressly to
apply to both types of municipalities.47  The statute could be
construed as binding municipal officers acting in their official
capacities.  Accordingly, a statutory construction that constrained
the actions of municipal officers also would apply to the police
chief of any Alaska municipality but not to state troopers or other
officers of statewide law enforcement agencies.48
2.  The Ratification Requirement.  The second significant
element of the statute addresses an exception to the general
prohibition on local firearms regulation.  A municipality seeking to
impose a regulatory regime first must obtain voter ratification of
the ordinance authorizing such a program.49  The voter ratification
requirement is not unique to firearms regulation.  In Libby v. City
of Dillingham,50 the Alaska Supreme Court invalidated a municipal
ordinance that purported to exempt the city’s board of trustees
from a statutory requirement that the city obtain voter ratification
to sell or lease city property.51  The statutory requirement of voter
ratification in Libby stated that
no ordinance for the sale, lease, or disposition of real property or
interest in real property valued at $25,000 or more is valid unless
ratified by a majority of the qualified voters voting at a regular
or special election at which the question of the ratification of the
ordinance is submitted.52
The municipal properties statute in Libby detailed at length the
procedural requirements of voter ratification.53  Specifically, the
statute in Libby went to great pains to prescribe the scope of the
requirement, the class of voters included, the kind of election at is-
sue, the requirement of presentment, the notice requirements for
ratification, the requirement of a majority of votes for ratification,
and, perhaps most importantly, the governmental body charged
with providing for the administration of the statute’s procedural
47. See id. §§ 29.35.145(b), 29.10.200(33).
48. Note that not all police officers in Alaska act under the authority of a mu-
nicipality.  In Alaska, “state police and enforcement officers are employed . . . and
removable by commissioners serving at the pleasure of the Governor.”  Theodore
v. Alaska, 407 P.2d 182, 188 (Alaska 1965).
49. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.145(a).
50. 612 P.2d 33 (Alaska 1980).
51. See id. at 42.
52. Id. at 36 n.5 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 29.48.260(c)(4) (Michie 1996)
(repealed 1985)).
53. See id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 29.48.260(c)).
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requirements.54  In sharp contrast, the Alaska preemption statute
fails to define a process of voter ratification that would presumably
validate restrictions on the ownership, possession, or traffic of fire-
arms within the state.55
By detailing the procedural requirements of ratification,56
Libby underscores by contrast the deficiencies in the Alaska pre-
emption statute and spotlights the difficulties of interpreting the
ratification requirement in the preemption statute merely through
strict adherence to the text.  For example, courts might construe
the ratification requirement in the preemption statute as com-
manding that a majority of votes in a given election be cast in favor
of a firearms regulation ordinance.57  But this interpretive leap may
assume both too little and too much.  Opponents of the ordinance
might promote an interpretation requiring the majority of regis-
tered voters in a given jurisdiction to approve the ordinance, re-
gardless of whether the actual turnout during the election was less
than complete.58  On the other hand, it is possible to imagine a
54. See id.
55. Compare id. with ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.145 (Michie 1996).
56. See Libby v. City of Dillingham, 612 P.2d at 42 (quoting ALASKA STAT. §
29.48.260(c)).
57. See, e.g., Area G Home and Landowners Org. v. Anchorage, 927 P.2d 728,
738-39 (Alaska 1996) (upholding separate voting component of dual majority rati-
fication scheme to expand service area of police department); ALASKA STAT. §
29.48.260(c)(4) (prescribing ratification scheme predicated on majority vote);
Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 8(b), 72 Stat. 339, 343-44 (1958)
(requiring majority of votes for given proposed amendment to the Alaska Consti-
tution).
58. Effectively, opponents of the ordinance might construe ratification to re-
quire a supermajority of the votes actually cast.  The case for interpreting the rati-
fication to require a supermajority arguably would be strong since the ordinance’s
purported purpose would be to limit a right guaranteed by the Alaska Constitu-
tion.  See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19 (“A well-regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not
be infringed. The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or
infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the State.”); cf. Sanford Levin-
son, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); William
Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE
L.J. 1236 (1994).  The United States Congress recently experimented with similar
requirements when the House of Representatives promulgated a rule requiring a
three-fifths vote to approve a bill that would raise federal income taxes.  See
Rules of the House of Representatives (104th Cong.), Rule XXI (5) (c), reprinted
in 141 Cong. Rec. H23 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995).  Several commentators have ques-
tioned whether such requirements were constitutional.  See Jed Rubenfeld, Rights
of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996); An Open Letter to
Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 (1995) (signed by Bruce Ackerman
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voting scheme where proponents could not muster an at-large
majority in favor of the ordinance but could win approval through
a representational voting scheme that assigned one vote to each
ward within a municipality.59 Nothing in the statute plainly pre-
cludes either process or any other ratification process per se be-
cause the statute simply fails to provide any guidance to munici-
palities who wish to present a firearms regulation ordinance for
ratification.60
Failure to prescribe a process for ratification also could lead
to an anomalous construction of the statute in another way.  Spe-
cifically, the statute’s silence on the ratification process grants gen-
eral law municipalities the authority to enact the substance of fire-
arms regulation, yet fails to provide the necessary procedural
mechanism to enact any firearms regulation at all.  The failing of
the statute is especially nettlesome because general law municipali-
ties may exercise only such authority as the state legislature vests
upon them.61  Since the preemption statute fails to specify a ratifi-
cation procedure and the Alaska code itself lacks any general pro-
vision prescribing ratification procedures,62 general law municipali-
ties lack any positive statutory authority to promulgate such
procedures.  If true, the result would be that general law jurisdic-
tions lack the authority to enact any firearms regulation ordinance.
This outcome would render inert Section (b) of the preemption
statute, which expressly applies the ratification requirement to
both “home rule and general law municipalities,” since section (b)
then expressly would appear to limit authority that the Alaska
legislature had never vested in the general law municipality.
                                                                                                                                
and sixteen others).  But see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The
Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE
L.J. 483 (1995).  For the purposes of this Note, resolution of whether such
schemes are appropriate or implicitly sanctioned by the Alaska preemption stat-
ute are of limited importance.
59. For example, a ward-based system would be likely to give numerical mi-
norities an advantage over an at-large system, similar to the advantage numerical
minorities gain by single-member districting in legislative bodies.  See LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 53 (1994); see also John F. Banzhaf III, One Man,
3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV.
304, 321 (1968).
60. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
61. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.04.020 (Michie 1996).
62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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A reasonable alternative interpretation that avoids disinte-
grating the statutory text63 is that the ratification requirement itself
serves as a grant of authority to promulgate ratification proce-
dures.  Once the existence of the statutory authority to promulgate
ratification procedures becomes clear, the most fundamental ques-
tion remains whether ratification may take place only by a plural-
ity or whether a minority of voters could ratify during a given elec-
tion.64  Conversely, a related controversy may focus on whether a
minority of voters could block ratification.65  These questions,
however, do not acknowledge that the context in which the term
“ratification” is used may import some elements necessary even to
text-based interpretations of the statute.66  Accordingly, the ratifi-
cation requirement’s relationship to majoritarian decision-making
can be evaluated using principles of statutory interpretation that
are, although contextually-informed, nevertheless consistent with
the principles of textualism.67  Therefore, the ratification require-
ment cannot fairly be read to construe the grant of authority so
broadly as to make the process of ratification a shibboleth.68  A mi-
nority of one cannot block ratification and neither can it suffice to
enact an otherwise unanimously rejected ordinance.  Whatever the
precise limits of this authority may be, they are not essential to re-
solving the question-in-chief, which is whether certain acts by state
63. The most fundamental principles of statutory construction oppose inter-
pretation of statutes that would eviscerate the meaning of other provisions.  See
M.R.S. v. Alaska, 897 P.2d 63, 66-67 (Alaska 1996) (“It is an established principle
of statutory construction that all sections of an act are to be construed together so
that all have meaning and no section conflicts with another.”); In re E.A.O., 816
P.2d 1352, 1357 (Alaska 1991) (holding that apparent contradictions in a statute
should be harmonized to avoid vitiating one provision in favor of the other).
64. See generally GUINIER, supra note 59.
65. See generally supra note 58.
66. See Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska
1996) (adopting a sliding scale to apply the rule with increasing vigor according to
the degree of textual ambiguity in light of antecedent statutory definition or judi-
cial construction); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE 262-69 (1990) (inter alia, “A normal English speaker does not . . . ig-
nore . . . external ambiguity.  He consults the totality of his relevant experience
. . . .  Meaning depends on context.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 113-14 (1990) (arguing
that the meaning of words depends “on both culture and context”).  But see
Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict
Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 407-09 (1994)
(harmonizing Justice Scalia’s textualism to the necessities of understanding stat-
utes in context).
67. See POSNER, supra note 66.
68. See id.
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or local officials always trigger the need for the ratification of a
proposed ordinance if such acts assist federal government regula-
tion of firearms.
3.  The Bundle of Rights.  The ratification procedure involves
presentment and ratification of an ordinance to carve out an
exception to the general rule that municipalities may not “restrict”
various rights related to the ownership, possession, or transport of
firearms.69  Therefore, ratification of the ordinance becomes an
issue only once the municipality or the local police, as the case may
be, have decided to restrict firearms-related rights.  The character
of the action constituting a “restriction” of such rights intrinsically
is tied to the nature of such rights.  Within the context of the Brady
Act, the most immediate and relevant right impacted is the right to
own a firearm.
Since the Alaska Constitution speaks only to the individual
right to “keep and bear arms,” the right to own a firearm per se,
does not have any special constitutional significance distinct from
the ownership of other forms of personal property.70  Alaska state
law recognizes that ownership of property is not a singular concept
but “consists of a bundle of separate rights, powers and privi-
leges.”71  Property rights normally are regulated and limited on the
basis of various policy reasons.72  To the extent such property rights
relate to “public health or safety, or to provide for the general wel-
fare,”73 the state of Alaska and its political subdivisions have the
constitutional authority to regulate property rights, including those
relating to firearms, under the state’s general police powers.74  So
69. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.145(a) (Michie 1996).
70. Compare id. with ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19.  The Alaska Constitution
presumably applies protection of firearm property rights with the same force as
applied to other instances of property ownership.  See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I,
§ 7 (guaranteeing due process and just compensation); id. art. I, § 14 (establishing
protection against unreasonable search and seizure of property).
71. Cool Homes, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 860 P.2d 1248, 1254
(Alaska 1993).
72. See generally Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509-10
(Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (discussing various forms of regulation over
rights constituting ownership of property).
73. Ravin v. Alaska, 537 P.2d 494, 509 (Alaska 1975).
74. See id. at 509; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12
(1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).  In the
context of land use, the police power over property may be limited by constitu-
tional protections requiring the state to pay compensation when a “taking” has
been effected.  See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027
(1992).
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the appropriate question is not whether the state or its instrumen-
talities may regulate the exercise of different components in the
“bundle of rights” constituting the right to own firearms, but it is
how extensive such regulation may be.
State statutes and municipal ordinances regulating the use of
property are often challenged on the ground that they constitute a
“taking” of private property without “substantive due process.”75
Since most such challenges originate in the states, property owners
frequently bring such cases under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.76  In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, the United States Supreme Court distinguished
“regulatory ‘takings’ – which require compensation – from regula-
tory deprivations that do not require compensation.”77  Although
the Court did not address those cases in which regulations of prop-
erty rights were barred,78 focusing on whether compensation must
be made for the taking of property,79 its opinion is instructive for
purposes of comparison.  Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
eloquently elaborated an important principle that distinguished the
regulation of land from the regulation of private property as fol-
lows:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of
all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensa-
tion only if the . . . inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title
to begin with.  This accords . . . with our “takings” jurisprudence,
which has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our
citizens regarding the content of, and the State’s power over, the
“bundle of rights” that they acquire when they obtain title to
property.  It seems to us that the property owner necessarily ex-
pects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time,
by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate ex-
ercise of its police powers; “[a]s long recognized, some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power.”  And in the case of personal property, by reason of the
State’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial
dealings, he ought to be aware of the possibility that new regula-
tion might even render his property economically worthless (at
75. See ROBERT A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.2, at 513
(1993).
76. See id.
77. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
78. The police power inheres in the states as described in the Tenth Amend-
ment.  The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X.
79. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
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least if the property’s only economically productive use is sale or
manufacture for sale).80
As was the case with interpreting the ratification requirement,
meaning depends on context.  Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Court demonstrates the degree of latitude that states and munici-
palities have, in the proper context, when they seek to limit real
property rights without requiring the government to pay compen-
sation.81  Given the wide berth cut around the state police power by
the Court in Lucas, it would be inconsistent to construe this power
any more narrowly in cases involving personal property.
That kind of inconsistency would be especially troubling in
light of Alaska law construing the constitutional provision that
protects the right to bear arms in Alaska.  Although the Alaska
Constitution always had included a constitutional provision similar
to the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution,
Alaska amended its constitution in 1994 to add a provision that
would protect the right to keep and bear arms from being “denied
or infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the State.”82
Both the legislative history and the statement of support for the
amendment as presented in the 1994 official election pamphlet
emphasized that the amendment would not invalidate otherwise
valid firearms regulations.83  Adhering to the stated purposes of the
recently amended constitutional provision,84 the Alaska courts
have rejected an absolutist interpretation of the individual right of
the citizens of Alaska to keep and bear arms.85  The courts have
plainly held that Article I, section 19 of the Alaska Constitution
“was not intended to eliminate government regulation of people’s
possession and use of firearms.”86  Instead, the constitutional provi-
sion has been interpreted to allow the government “to enact and
enforce laws prohibiting people from possessing firearms when
there is a significant risk that they will use those firearms in a
criminal or dangerous fashion.”87
80. See id. at 1027 (citations omitted).
81. See id.
82. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19.
83. See Gibson v. Alaska, 920 P.2d 1300, 1301-02 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)
(describing the legislative and proposed amendment ratification history of the
constitutional amendment).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1301.
86. See id.
87. See id; see also Morgan v. Alaska, 943 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Alaska Ct. App.
1997).  Similar provisions have been construed likewise in other states.  See, e.g.,
Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 346 (Colo. 1994) (“[T]he right to bear
arms is not absolute; the Colorado Constitution limits that right. . . .  Thus, stat-
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C. State Law Application of a Reconstructed Alaska Preemption
Statute
Applying the principles articulated by Justice Scalia in Lucas
requires that rights of ownership and possession of firearms not be
interpreted in a vacuum.88  Instead, an individual seeking to acquire
title to firearms within the territorial jurisdiction of Alaska must
“necessarily expect[] the uses of his property to be restricted, from
time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in le-
gitimate exercise of its police powers.”89  This expectation is part
and parcel of the title acquired and determines the contours of the
rights inherent in ownership.90
Again, a fair interpretation of the Alaska preemption statute
must avoid reading either the right to own a firearm or the state’s
countervailing police power in absolute terms.91  To avoid making a
nullity out of either element,92 a fair interpreter must consult the
principle undergirding the exercise of the state’s police power.  In
this case, the Alaska courts have determined that the state’s power
to regulate an individual’s property rights with respect to firearms
rests on a legitimate state interest to address a “significant risk that
they will use those firearms in a criminal or dangerous fashion.”93
To the extent that local officials base regulation upon this risk, the
regulation will be consistent with the reasonably apprehended na-
ture of the firearms purchaser’s bundle of rights.94
In cases where municipalities regulate in the absence of this
risk, the regulation will frustrate the reasonable expectations of the
putative owner regarding the rights inhering in the acquisition of
title to firearms.  Restraining localities’ ability to diminish this
bundle of rights is ultimately what the preemption statute is
about.95  As demonstrated, a reading of Alaska law that avoids ne-
gating any constitutional or statutory provision relating to the
regulation of firearms leads away from the conclusion that any at-
tempt at firearms regulation by a municipality triggers the ratifica-
                                                                                                                                
utes enacted pursuant to the state’s police power may validly restrict or regulate
the right to possess arms where the purpose of such possession is not a constitu-
tionally protected one.”).
88. See supra notes 66, 80-81 and accompanying text.
89. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
90. See id.
91. See id.; Gibson, 920 P.2d at 1301-02.
92. See M.R.S. v. Alaska, 897 P.2d 63, 66-7 (Alaska 1996); In re E.A.O., 816
P.2d 1352, 1357 (Alaska 1991).
93. Gibson, 920 P.2d at 1301.
94. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
95. See supra Part III.B.3.
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tion requirement.96  To the contrary, a fair reading of the relevant
state provisions suggests that the ratification requirement in the
Alaska preemption statute is triggered whenever a municipal offi-
cer acts to regulate the ownership and use of firearms in the ab-
sence of a significant risk that the regulated individual will use
those firearms in a criminal or dangerous fashion.  Thus inter-
preted, the reconstructed preemption statute demonstrates that
the application of sound statutory interpretation leads to a result
that better harmonizes the statute with existing Alaska law than
would be attained by the application of plain meaning alone.
IV.  THE FEDERAL NEXUS
This inquiry into the contours of the Alaska preemption stat-
ute began with Justice Scalia’s suggestion that state preemption
statutes like those in Montana and Arizona97 could operate to bar
local officials from voluntarily participating in federal firearms
regulation regimes.98  As will be discussed more fully below, analy-
sis of Justice Scalia’s comment in the Printz opinion reveals that
the Court’s position on this issue is not settled, and that Printz
provides little guidance on the issue of statutory preemption.99
Moreover, a detailed textual analysis of the Alaska preemption
statute suggests that the statute imposes no restraints on munici-
palities that regulate firearms as long as there is a substantial risk
the regulated individual will use the weapon in a dangerous or
criminal fashion.100  Consequently, a municipality’s authority to
regulate firearms, although not absolute, does not depend solely
on voter ratification of a proposed ordinance.101  In the absence of
any interaction with a federal regulatory regime, Alaska munici-
palities have some independent authority to regulate firearms un-
der their general police power.102
It is clear, however, that regardless of whether municipalities
have such independent authority, the Court’s holding in
Printz stands for the premise that municipalities may not be com-
pelled to administer a federal regulatory program.103  On the other
hand, Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that states and municipalities
96. See id.
97. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-351 (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3108 (B)
(1989).
98. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
99. See supra Part II.
100. See supra Part III.C.
101. See id.
102. Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
103. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997).
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may willingly participate with the federal government’s firearms
regulation regime104 is especially tenable as applied to Alaska since
both Alaska state and federal law provisions regulating firearms
are coextensive.105  For example, a municipality might choose to re-
view an applicant to purchase firearms in order to prevent con-
victed felons from purchasing firearms.106  Such screening would be
authorized under Alaska state law regardless of the fact that Sec-
tion 922 (s) (1) of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 also makes
it a federal crime to transfer a handgun to an individual without
taking certain steps to determine whether the individual is a con-
victed felon.107  Printz assures that the federal government could
not compel the municipality to perform the screening function,108
but does not directly answer whether a state or locality may pre-
vent an official from sharing such information with federal authori-
ties once the locality has acquired the information.109
Although Printz makes clear that Congress does not have the
authority to compel states to administer a gun-screening program,
Congress does have the authority to enact regulations affecting in-
dividuals and their commercial activity.110  Once an act of Congress
is passed pursuant to a legitimate exercise of its power to regulate
interstate commerce,111 that act becomes the supreme law of the
land.112  Consistent with the principle of supremacy, Congress may
exercise its power to regulate even in areas where such regulation
would preempt contrary state legislation or even effectively change
state policies.113  Most importantly, the states may not interpose to
104. See id. at 2385 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
105. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (s)(1)(A)(I), 922 (s)(3)(B) (1994) with ALASKA
STAT. § 11.61.200 (Michie 1996).
106. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(a)(2).
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1).
108. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
109. See supra Part II.
110. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
111. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.”).
112. See id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
113. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger,
122 F.3d 58, 67-68 (1st Cir. 1997).
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hamper or prevent the vindication of rights guaranteed by federal
law.114
Interposition may result from the implementation of local or
statewide policies that interfere with the voluntary exchange of in-
formation with federal authorities.  In City of New York v. United
States,115 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York considered whether a city policy could prohibit municipal of-
ficials from cooperating with federal immigration agents unless,
among other requirements, aliens about whom the immigration
agents were seeking information were suspected of “engaging in
criminal activity,” and had authorized the city to verify their immi-
gration status.116  New York City argued, relying on Printz, that
states and localities could prevent their officials from cooperating
with federal immigration officers.117  The district court pointed out
that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence expressly had distinguished
“purely ministerial reporting requirements” as well as several
other federal regulatory schemes that required participation by lo-
cal and state officials from provisions that “directly compel state
officials to administer a federal regulatory program.”118  If any-
thing, concluded the district court, the federal requirements ad-
dressed in City of New York, which proscribed the imposition of
“gag orders” regarding a person’s immigration status, were “even
less intrusive on state sovereignty than those mandatory reporting
statutes” contemplated by Justice O’Connor.119  Accordingly, the
district court concluded that the coercive element the Supreme
Court had invalidated in Printz was absent from the federal stat-
utes because these statutes would not commandeer New York City
officials to administer a federal program.120  Finally, the district
court rejected as unhelpful and inappropriate any analysis relying
on distinguishing “core” or “traditional” governmental functions.121
In construing Printz, therefore, the district court relied principally
on the degree of federal intrusion exerted upon the municipality
and on whether the federal government was commandeering the
114. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 n.16 (1997); New York,
505 U.S. at 179; Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904,
928 n.44 (8th Cir. 1997).
115. 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
116. See id. at 792.
117. See id. at 796.
118. See id. (quoting Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
119. See id. at 792-93, 796.
120. See id. at 796.
121. See id. at 798.
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resources of the local government in pursuit of the federal regula-
tory objective.122
Put in this context, the Alaska preemption statute does not
bar the voluntary participation of local officials in the regulation of
firearms.  It is hard to imagine, for example, how voluntary par-
ticipation in a federal regulation scheme could be any more intru-
sive upon state sovereignty than the federal bar on immigration
status gag orders,123 or the requirement of reporting missing chil-
dren mentioned by Justice O’Connor in her Printz concurrence.124
If the municipality’s participation is truly voluntary, none of the
elements of coercion that the Court cited as the basis of its opinion
in Printz would apply.125  The degree of federal intrusion would be
so minimal that a request to participate in a federal firearms regu-
lation program by local officials may, in certain cases, be seen as a
form of commandeering federal resources for the municipality’s
benefit.126
That a voluntary scheme would entail a minimal degree of
federal intrusion does not mean that the municipality or the state
always must volunteer to participate in the process of federal law
enforcement.  After all, the federal government may regulate
“even in areas where such regulation would preempt contrary state
legislation or even effectively change state policies.”127  As such,
City of New York serves as a reminder to heady neo-federalists
that non-compliant state and local authorities cannot, by failing to
volunteer or by actively opposing federal regulation, interpose
themselves between the federal government and its legitimate ob-
jects of regulation.128
V.  CONCLUSION
The Alaska preemption statute has remained uninterpreted
by the courts for more than a decade.  Justice Scalia’s provocative
footnote in Printz v. United States suggested a possible interpretive
approach.  However, Justice Scalia’s footnote and his historical
analysis in Printz help to illustrate how a surface gloss on the statu-
122. See id. at 792-96.
123. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
124. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2385 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
125. Cf. id. at 2380.
126. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
127. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992); see also Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 67-68 (1st Cir. 1997).
128. See City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 792.
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tory text leads to a dissatisfying interpretation of the statute.  In
this case, an interpretation faithful to the text, prevailing constitu-
tional doctrine, and the development of Alaska law leads to a dif-
ferent conclusion than that suggested by Justice Scalia’s footnote.
A close reading of the Alaska preemption statute indicates that
even under Printz, the statute does not prohibit voluntary munici-
pal participation in federal firearms regulation or require voter
ratification prior to the enforcement of all local firearms regula-
tions.  Instead, the reconstructed text indicates that municipalities
seeking to enact firearms regulations in the absence of a significant
risk that the regulated individual will use firearms in a dangerous
or criminal way must enact those ordinances through the process
of voter ratification.  Attributing a greater mandate to the statute
might risk stretching the meaning of the text and the legitimacy of
the interpretive approach thereby employed beyond their breaking
point.
Thomas E. Castleton
